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 The privatization of water in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area is a long and complex process 
that continues today. The city’s greatest privatization effort, the National Water Law of 1992, 
was imposed by the federal government with assurances of improvement in accessibility, quality 
and sustainability. The resulting system that exists today has been largely ineffective in achieving 
these initial goals. Despite some progress in infrastructure, the partially-private system has 
aggravated the very social inequalities it aimed to alleviate, further marginalizing the poorest 
citizens through their water’s high costs, far-reaching inaccessibility, and poor quality. In the 
decentralized water system, contradictions become apparent. Promises of expansion and 
improvement are unkept and unpunished, accountability is lost between government and private 
agencies, leaving citizens confused about who holds the responsibility, the blame, and most 
importantly, the solution.    
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The management of water in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA), located in the 
North-Eastern region of Mexico, has proved difficult for centuries. However, since entering the 
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era of urbanization and globalization it has experienced overwhelming growth in population and 
industrialization, which has exacerbated the water crisis for the 20 million people living there 
today.  The state’s shrinking capacity to manage the water system and failure to improve water 
allocation, accessibility and efficiency, allowed the private sector to assume the responsibility in 
1993. In line with the neoliberal climate of the time, the Mexican Government looked for 
solutions in the form of autonomous, “better-abled” institutions -foreign companies. The 1993 
National Water Law placed Mexico City’s water burden into the hands of private entities and 
was rationalized by the government and proponents by pledging that water accessibility and 
quality would be improved, while both financial and environmental sustainability would be 
attained.  
Since then the city’s water system has been a center of public and legal attention, 
undergoing few profound changes since privatization, and making little expansion or 
improvement since the privatization efforts. Numerous attempts of minor policy reforms to 
combat the water crisis in Mexico City since the 1980s have resulted in a partially-private water 
sector. Today, inaccessibility, social inequality, and general distrust of tap water still define 
water culture. In the partially-privatized water system,  policies claimed to expand water 




The primary materials used for research were scholarly economic, political, and 
occasionally environmental articles related to water management during the time of study; 
3 
1990’s - 2014. While most studies on public sector privatization emphasized the transition period 
during the 1990s, this paper aims to fill in gaps between that period and contemporary times. 
Early research was conducted using Google Scholar, later research was specified through 
exploration of the sources from more broad articles found. While most research was based on 
studies in the field of water management and privatization, some was drawn from official 
statements and legislation by the World Bank, the Mexican Government, and other related 
institutions.  
I aimed to organize my findings in a chronological manner, emphasizing those time 
periods and transformations most critical to the story of water privatization in the MCMA. In the 
following section, I present the demographic factors relevant to the challenge of water provision 
and management, population growth being the most prominent. In the next section I turn to the 
neoliberal policies that characterized the 1990s on a global scale, and analyze their influence on 
Mexico’s public sectors. The process to privatization in the MCMA has gone through many 
superficial and substantial revisions, making it difficult to follow chronologically.  Despite this, I 
attempt to highlight the most significant steps toward private sector participation in the 
penultimate section. The ultimate section is an assessment of water privatization in the MCMA 
in 2014, and includes analysis of improvement in water quality, access, and sustainability. In 
conclusion, I present the current debate about the future of MCMA water; important 
discrepancies are found between the government’s proposals-- backed by those private entities 
involved in planned development projects, and proposals put forth by those in opposition, 
including water rights activists and environmental groups.  
Demography of MCMA 
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         Demographics within the city have provided one of the most difficult challenges for 
government water planners and the private sector. For decades leading up to the current crisis 
Mexico City has been the nation’s center for industrialization, urbanization, capital investment 
and population growth. The Mexico City of 1940 looked a lot different, with a population of 1.75 
million people, by 1950 industrial and economic activities were increasing along with a steady 
population growth. As the population grew to an unprecedented size, the government of Mexico 
made efforts to organize the urban chaos, including a ban on additional housing being built. By 
1960 the population experienced a 73 percent increase in just ten years, with 5 million people, 
the metropolitan area now included fifteen boroughs of the Federal District and four 
municipalities in the State of Mexico. As a result of urban developments and investments, urban 
land use increased 73 percent between 1960 and 1970 (Tortajada 358). Today, the MCMA alone 
is home to eighteen percent of Mexico’s total population; a result of the rural-to-urban migration 
trend, which had much to do with urban development and low employment rates. In the MCMA,  
people come in search of economic opportunity and access to services, but face economic 
obstacles in obtaining these services, it is important to note that poverty is most severely 
entrenched in these urban areas (Wilder & Lankao 1981).  
The steadily increasing demand on the water supply meant more pressure on the local 
government -where public scrutiny was generally directed. The Mexican government aimed to 
preserve land and discourage further migration into the city from rural regions.  It is illegal to 
build and reside on conservation land, reducing access to water, sewage and electricity for those 
who already live there. However, the “illegal” settler community holds a huge part of the 
demographic in Mexico City. By 2003, some 80 percent of new houses were constructed on 
illegal land (Tortajada 358).  
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Geography of MCMA 
Mexico has two percent of the global population and only one percent of the global water 
supply. Water provision is a national obstacle, “In 2000, 12 Mexican states were declared federal 
emergencies due to prolonged drought” (Wilder & Lankao 1980). Many regions are prone to 
drought, inefficiency in provision, maintenance and expansion, leaving millions of Mexicans 
suffering from long term water scarcity. The MCMA has more rainy days with London, about 28 
inches of precipitation per year, explaining the vast lakes that characterized the area during the 
reign of the Aztecs. However, rainfall is not harnessed efficiently, and only supplies the city with 
a fraction of the water supply (Wilder & Lankao 1981).  
While geographical factors do pose a challenge to water administration, they alone are 
not responsible for widespread scarcity and inaccessibility. In order to meet water demand in the 
MCMA, over 30 percent of the water supply is imported from outside of the basin. In fact since 
the 1990s, average per capita water distribution in the MCMA has been about 300 liters per day, 
three times higher than minimum international standard of 100 liters per day (Castro 332). The 
concept of “artificial” scarcity is applicable to water in the MCMA, the resource is present, but 
inefficient management and infrastructure make it unavailable in many areas. In the 1990s the 
MCMA was losing an average 40 percent of water volume through faulty pipes each year 
(Wilder & Lankao 1982). At a national level, only twelve percent of the Mexican water supply is 
consumed by urban or public users. This in contrast with the eighty percent consumed by the 
agricultural sector, which produces a mere four percent of the national GDP.  Industrial water 
use is only eight percent of Mexico’s total water supply, but the sector is highly polluting and 
unregulated (Wilder & Lankao 1982). 
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Neoliberal Solution  
Neoliberalism, by definition, is an economic policy model that puts great emphasis on 
property rights, rule of law, and free markets to maximize individual freedoms and lead society 
to its maximum potential. The sole role of the state is to create and maintain legal and financial 
institutions to facilitate free trade among individuals and businesses. In this model, “private 
enterprise and entrepreneurial initiative are seen as the keys to innovation and wealth creation” 
which translates into a new approach for poverty alleviation (Harvey 164). Through this lense, 
the development of a country is dependent on their government's ability to create a business-
friendly environment within which enterprises can compete. The government administration of 
public goods or services without cost-recovery is argued to create a culture of dependency 
among citizens, who, as the direct beneficiaries should pay full market value for all commodities. 
A government is seen as inept, unstable, or irresponsible for providing public services or 
enforcing protectionist regulations, as they discourage trade and capital growth. 
Therefore, development strategies reflect economic policies favorable to private sector 
participation in all public life and the adoption of market value for all commodities. All public 
enterprises, including education, electricity, transport, public health, water, and sewage, should 
be sold and bought on the international market, where they (usually) end up in the hands of 
foreign firms with a large capacity for investment (Goldman 789).  The increase in private sector 
participation has been promoted as the best model for improving efficiency of infrastructure, 
extending delivery to poorer areas, and relieving government expenditure (Castro 334).  
World Bank 
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An important thing to note about global neoliberalism, is that its relatively recent 
development and rapid growth were the result of concentrated efforts to subtly but dramatically 
alter the ideology of the global policy network on poverty alleviation. The process of how 
neoliberal philosophy came to dominate so many policy agendas in Southern countries began in 
the 1980s, when World Bank, IMF and major development investors became involved in the 
War on Poverty. Privatization soon dominated the conversation on resource management 
solutions, as “the World Bank and others maintain that decentralization leads to improved 
accountability, empowerment of local communities, and benefits for the management of natural 
resources” (Wilder and Lankao 1978). This approach being presented globally as “consensus” 
can be attributed to the Bank’s successful efforts in; creating and maintaining exclusive elite 
transnational policy networks, and issuing loans targeted at water privatization while imposing 
requirements on borrowing countries to open their markets to foreign capital (Goldman 790).  
The role of the World Bank, the primary investment facilitator worldwide in development 
projects, cannot be underestimated. Looking back, we see that the agenda of the World Bank of 
the 1950s and 1960s had little to do with poverty alleviation or global development. During this 
time the World Bank operated out of Washington, largely under Wall Street bankers. Loans to 
Southern governments were generally small,  range remained within capital-intensive 
infrastructure projects like railroads or power plants. Post-independence Southern governments 
were struggling to meet citizens demands  that had been promised to come with liberation, while 
suffering immense divestment from the North. As industrialization and urban investment became 
central to economic focus throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the institutional jurisdiction of the 
Bank and IMF became expanded to (what they call) global development and poverty alleviation 
(Goldman 788).  
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This transformation is most notable under Bank President Robert McNamara, who 
through new policies on the allowance of profitable international bonds, created a market-
friendly environment for huge “development” investors. This secure and profitable arena 
presented the Global South in a whole new light to multinational investors, an untapped market 
of natural resources paired with bankrupt governments created a large demand for basic services 
and an enormous margin for profit. Financial security for these huge Bank loans came from 
political and economic guarantees that would minimize risk and maximize control for the 
Northern investors that lent to economically or politically unstable countries. The creation of a 
low-risk/high-reward market came with new knowledge production sites and think tanks, as well 
as pervasive international training in the World Bank development approach. These contributed 
to an exclusive professional class of global expertise, being newly regarded as a “development 
community”. In the first five years under McNamara (1968-1973), the Bank financed more 
projects and loaned more money than in the previous 22 years combined (Goldman 788). 
Through the creation of exclusive data analysis sites and the export of the Bank’s neoliberal 
ideology, McNamara’s “global expertise” on poverty rapidly began gaining power and influence. 
In fact, “by the late 1980s, the Bank’s training center was preparing thousands of professionals 
annually, with more than 3000 in the field of economic development alone (Goldman 789).  
Global Water Policy  
 The global policy on water embodied neoliberal philosophy, which under the guise of 
“consensus”, led powerful international institutions to accept market logic and set agendas 
accordingly. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Water and the Environment resulted in the 
adoption of the Dublin Declaration, whose fourth principle enshrines the neoliberal view of 
water as an economic good whose allocation can be governed through the market (Castro 334).  
9 
Through the neoliberal conception, water scarcity in Southern countries is the result of public 
policy and institutional failures. A state that suffers recurrent financial or political crisis can not 
provide or develop the services or infrastructure required by their citizens. Private entities are 
therefore prompted as alternatives to government mediation. In Mexico, the water crisis was 
argued to be the result of inefficient administration, the absence of market mechanisms, and the 
legal insecurity of water rights (Castro 335). Privatization is put forth as a key strategy for; 
“more efficient provision of service by local authorities, private companies and water users, and 
for a more efficient and equitable allocation and use of the resource” (Wilder & Lankao 1978). 
Full commodification of the natural resource is a strict conditionality for private sector 
involvement; the assertion being that without the enforcement of property rights, market 
mechanisms will not be effective in achieving goals of efficiency, accessibility, and quality. The 
need for a new culture was justified deeming the one that prevailed as an “ingrained dependency 
culture”, one in which the state guaranteed the resource, while users reaped the benefits for free. 
This claim has been met with public opposition and a growing perception of illegitimacy in 
government (Castro 169). The “consumer-pays” and “polluter-pays” principles define the private 
sector ambition to obtain financial efficiency and environmental sustainability. These principles 
mean that external costs of water provision are assumed by water users via water tariffs. Despite 
large discrepancies between high costs and the average family income, these principles are 
presented as economic incentives to preserve the resource (Wilder & Lankao 1980). The 
neoliberal recommendation for water system management is to; adopt international accounting 
methods, submit to grading by international credit agencies, charge full market price, and 
establish public-private partnerships.  
Political Context of Mexico 
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 Water rights were a central theme during the Mexican Revolution, which led to the 
declaration of water as a public good in the 1917 Mexican Constitution. We see that neoliberal 
doctrine did not always define Mexico’s approach to natural resource management. Article 27 of 
the Constitution stated; “The property of land and water within the the boundaries of the national 
territory belong originally to the Nation, which has had and still as the right to grant control over 
them to individuals thus constituting the private property… The nation will permanently retain 
the right of imposing on private property the requirements dictated by the public interest, as well 
as regulating, for the social well being, the development of natural resources” (Castro 329). 
Despite the revolutionary promises of equal access to water  and democratic control of its 
systems, Mexico has yet to achieve either. Mexico’s neoliberal transformation began in the late 
1980s under Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President from 1988 to 1994. While his party was born 
out of the Revolution, the country’s faith in democracy has diminished under the 71 year rule of 
the Party of Institutionalized Revolution or PRI.  
Historically, Mexico has experienced strong state involvement and control of the 
economy and civil society. The diminishing role of the state in public life is seen through the 
passing of neoliberal reforms of all major public services. Salinas de Gortari’s tenure showed his 
compliance with neoliberal ideology through his modernization strategy deemed the National 
Development Plan. The plan outlined the opening of the Mexican economy to international 
markets via free trade agreements and the removal of protectionist measures. These policies were 
aimed at reducing the role and responsibility of the state while increasing private sector 
involvement, for example state investment in water infrastructure has been declining since the 
National Water Law, despite the steady rise in demand (Wilder & Lankao 1979). Endless urban 
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expansion put impossible pressure on the poorly managed water system while the government 
was losing popularity and the means to invest, making private sector involvement inevitable.  
National Water Law 
The most expansive reform in Mexican Water Policy, the National Water Law of 1992, 
was enshrined in the National Development Plan, and was much in line with “Global” Water 
Policy, as it depended heavily on World Bank funding. This new law “decentralized water 
system management from the federal level to state and municipal governments and opened the 
door for privatization of municipal service provision” (Wilder & Lankao 1982).  The primary 
investors in the new water-development initiative were the International Monetary Fund, who 
loaned US$200 million, and the World Bank, who loaned a generous US$350 million (Wilder & 
Lankao 1982). After going 38 revisions in Congress, the outcome included an amendment to the 
Mexican Constitution, the full commodification of the natural resource, the privatization of water 
services, the creation of a public register of water rights, and a diminishing state role in public 
life. The amendment to Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution changed the status of water from a 
public good to an economic resource now subject to market fluctuations and possessing 
economic value and tradability in the same way as land. To quote water authorities; “water has 
ceased to be a free good and from now on it is a resource which has an economic value and 
society must pay for it” (Castro 334).  
The Law also called for full governance of water based on market principles, with full 
private sector involvement. In 1993, the Federal District Water Commission signed provision 
contracts with private firms Suez, Vivendi, Severn Trent, and United Utilities. Among the 
responsibilities assumed by the European companies were the formation of a complete register of 
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water users, the administration of water metering and the enforcement of water billing. The 
formation of the “Public Register of Water Rights” required users to surrender any existing water 
titles, then re-apply. The application process often included the submission of property titles, a 
defining obstacle for the millions living out of city bounds. Approved users were subject to the 
“conditions” of their service, which could translate into volume restrictions or excessive fees 
(Castro 335).  
In Congress, the opposition was vocal about their concerns, stating that the law would 
facilitate the monopolization of the water sector, thus leaving users vulnerable to the “market-
set” prices. Additionally, they pointed to the large discrepancy between provisions meant to 
protect the market and those meant to protect users’ rights and the prevention of environmental 
degradation, the latter of which were almost non-existent. Public opposition came in the form of 
popular protest as well as payment and registration refusal by users after implementation. This 
resistance was so widespread that even with the appropriate and effective instruments to enforce 
the law, non-compliant users only occasionally faced any legal consequences (Castro 170). 
Cutzamala Water Provision 
“The amount of water coming out of the taps mirrors inequality… Pipe pressure matches 
income levels” (Barkin 5). This statement rings true when examining water’s journey from the 
city’s main source - Cutzamala. Supply cuts are more common in low income neighborhoods 
and costs of water are high -largely due to the hefty electric bill of Cutzamala system, which 
essentially includes lifting a small lake 100 km and a journey of 100 km through 30 year old 
pipes in desperate need of maintenance. The Cutzamala reservoir system was an expensive 
development project aimed at alleviating water shortages and the associated social unrest. The 
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head of SACMEX, Manuel Reyes described Cutzamala water as the most expensive in world, 
while describing the city’s water department as, “understaffed, underfunded, and overworked”. 
The city allocates 2.4 billion pesos to tap water provision, and passes the remaining costs to 
consumers through set costs based on “expense-recovery”, a burden heavier in the most 
marginalized areas.  
The Cutzamala system for example, has deep social implications at its source as well as 
its final destination; as with most other reservoirs it lies outside of the MCMA and was imposed 
upon an already existent community -the Mazahua, one of Mexico’s oldest indigenous groups. 
The Cutzamala system provides about 30 percent of MCMA water, and is met with resistance 
from its source community, who claim the system has created scarcity and other environmental 
degradation in their area. Since the construction of the plant and treatment facility, the 
community has mobilized frequently demanding clean water in every home -an almost absurd 
deficiency in an area characteristic of natural springs and healthy rivers. The Mazahua attempts 
against the invasion are often met with federally issued riot police, adding to the already 
persistent public insecurity.    
Cutzamala water passes firstly through the wealthy neighborhoods of Miguel Hidalgo 
and Cuajimalpa, where consumers enjoy high water pressure and quality; this area is also home 
to the city’s golf courses and many residents afford lawn sprinklers. The aggravating nature of 
the system is seen as the pipes run eastward; area incomes levels and pipe pressures decline. The 
most eastern settlement of Iztapalapa constitutes 1.8 million people and is known for its deeply 
entrenched poverty and high crime rates. The growing community represents a larger trend of 
urbanization; the past four decades have brought unprecedented numbers of illegal settlements of 
people in search of better economic opportunity and access to resources and services. The 
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development of Iztapalapa was unplanned, and the grievances of its citizens have been largely 
ignored due to their illegitimate settlement status. Upon arriving at Iztapalapa, tap water has lost 
a third of its volume and even more of its pressure through 150 km of pipes and their associated 
40 percent leakage rate. In Iztapalapa, “taps are dry more often than not” and residents are 
heavily reliant on imported water from tanker trucks, which “remain a lifeline” despite their 
relatively outrageous costs -which can consume up to a fifth of the average family’s income 
(Watts 7). 
Waste Water 
The growing development of urban industry without enforcement of environmental 
regulations, explains the high levels of pollution found in urban and development areas (Castro 
331). The effective management of wastewater has yet to be achieved as well, as there is no 
natural exit, discharging wastewater is one of the largest and most expensive feats for the city. 
The system today exists in about 11,000 km of piping through three main channels, which all end 
in areas surrounding the MCMA. Water within the city is not recycled, thus it arrives at its final 
destination untreated and highly polluting. Tula Valley, about 100 km north of the city, is home 
to one of the three largest wastewater plants, making it another high-profile contention location. 
Toxins in the water have been proven to affect crops and cause other water-related 
diseases, angering locals who claim that their territory has been turned into a dumping ground 
without their consent or compensation. Local Sabino Juarez, describes the tendency of the 
government to discriminate against indigenous communities by constructing the highly polluting 
plant then blatantly disregarding protective measures. In 2008, hundreds of community members 
united in protest against toxins in the water. The government responded by deploying riot police 
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to the small town of La Cruz, where protesters were assaulted with batons and rifle butts, while 
others were forcibly removed and/or tortured. Over six years later, little effort has been made by 
the Mexican government to address their claims.  
 
 
Assessment of Water Privatization  
 While the concessional model did increase revenue for water companies, the system did 
not achieve one of the most popular arguments in its favor: financial self-sufficiency. Mexico has 
in fact increased expenditure in the water sector since the privatization efforts. Progress in 
efficiency in the water sector can be seen between 1993 and 2000 through the slight 
improvement of “installations of taps, meters, creation of customer’s inventory, and water 
billing” (Wilder & Lankao 1986). More equitable access to water was another supposed goal of 
the water reforms, however privatization has in some cases worsened unequal access to water. 
The polluter-pay principle was a central part to address environmental concerns. Costs of 
environmental consequences are internalized by private management and passed on to drinking 
water users in the form of high water rates on provision and water imports (Wilder & Lankao 
1980).  
Interestingly, the jurisdictional regions allocated to private firms excluded a portion of 
the MCMA, whose inhabitants continue to rely on the government for water provision and 
regulation (Barkin 3). Water users in illegal conservation land in the surrounding MCMA tend to 
be the poorest, lacking any legitimate access to water, they are most reliant on imported and 
bottled water and most subjected to the corresponding high rates. A contradiction arises in the 
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privatization argument when the most poverty-entrenched areas marginalized further by high 
costs, inaccessibility, and poor quality. Urban areas are home to 75 percent of the population, the 
the MCMA the most marginalized communities are those built on private or conservation land 
surrounding the city. Due to the illegality of these settlements, services are not provided by the 
government. Residents in these communities lack official titles and property rights and are 
therefore heavily reliant on illegal, home-made water hookups, which are often unreliable and 
insufficient for large populations. Water quality is questionable despite being “treated”. Water 
testing is not enforced or made available. Many people must purchase water brought by large 
tanker trucks from surrounding areas, which costs up to 600 percent more than city tap water as 
private vendors have the freedom to set prices according to demand. Tanker water is also subject 
to high import fees, a burden assumed by consumers (Tortajada 358).  
Mexico City’s title as the thirstiest city in the world continues to be relevant today. In 
2014, engineers estimate that 300 litres are required for each of the 8.8 million residents, the 
highest demand of any city in the world. The millions of people that commute daily into the 
MCMA for work add to an ever growing demand. Problems of efficiency remain. 40 percent of 
water is still lost through leakage in the system, showing about two percentage points of 
improvement since 1995 (Wilder & Lankao 1980). Furthermore, 70 percent of residents’ taps run 
for less than 12 hours per day, while those of 18 percent provide only an hour or two of service 
every few days (Watts 3).  
Conclusion  
While demography and geography are challenges to water management in the MCMA, 
they are not solely responsible for the water crisis. Artificial scarcity arises when the resource is 
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poorly managed or unevenly distributed. The late 1980s brought the opening of the Mexican 
economy to the international private sector. The neoliberal climate of the time caused a wave of 
privatization of public assets throughout the global South. The neoliberal logic to resource 
management advocates  a passive state role, governance on market principles and an unregulated 
private sector. This approach was presented as a “consensus” on global water policy, but reflects 
the dominance of neoliberal ideology permeating the world’s most powerful institutions, namely 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In the case of Mexico, the World Bank was 
the primary investor in the Mexican National Development Plan of 1990, an ambitious policy 
which included an extensive economic reform of public sectors and infrastructure. Under this 
umbrella, the National Water Law left a partially private system that is maintained today through 
the renewal of short term concessional contracts with foreign water companies (Castro 333).  
Proponents of water privatization and the Mexican government promised improvement in 
infrastructure, quality and accessibility, and attainment of environmental and financial 
sustainability. Under my assessment, their efforts failed to meet these standards.  Despite some 
progress in infrastructure, the partially-private system has aggravated the very social inequalities 
it aimed to alleviate, further marginalizing the poorest citizens through the high cost of water, 
lack of access, and poor quality.  The flaws of the partially-private system are most visible in 
Cutzamala water provision, where accessibility and quality varies greatly depending on the 
neighborhood. Illegal settler communities lack property titles, which are a requirement to apply 
for water rights under the National Water Law. In this way, vast poverty-entrenched 
communities are left vulnerable to market prices and poor water quality, exacerbating financial 
instability and poor access to health services.  
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Contradictions are seen between the supposed benefits and realities of a decentralized and 
privatized water system as many communities continue to suffer from intermittent water service, 
inaccessibility, and poor quality. The MCMA water system that exists today is similar to the 
fragmented partially-private system implemented in 1993 since it has undergone only minimal 
modifications. Comprehensive reform in the water sector should include considerations for all 
citizens, which could be achieved through re-centralization of water management, 
democratization of the decision making process, and equalized provision. The neoliberal 
ambitions of the 1990s have proved incompatible with social equality. Today, the path forward 
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